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I. Introduction
Fragmentation of production combined with the creation of distribution networks spanning across continents characterizes the second globalization that has gained momentum in recent years.
1 Information revolution and new technologies have made it possible to divide the industry's value chain into smaller functions that can be contracted out to independent suppliers.
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This fragmentation of production offers a unique opportunity for producers in less developed countries to move from servicing small local markets to supplying large firms abroad and indirectly their customers all over the world. This phenomenon is accompanied by an evolution in the nature of competition with its growing emphasis on customization of products, rapid innovation, flexibility and fast response to changes in demand. In many cases, managerial and technological skills required to successfully compete in global markets make it impossible to rely on the resources of one country. Under these circumstances, integration into the production and marketing arrangements of the multinational corporations (MNCs) rather than the pursuit of an autarchic national development strategy has become the most efficient way of taking advantage of growth opportunities offered by the global economy.
While the economic literature has carefully studied potential benefits brought by inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) such as technology transfer and spillovers, 3 little attention has been paid to other advantages arising from the presence of multinationals. This paper aims to fill a gap in the existing literature by examining the positive effect of FDI created through the integration of a host country into the global economy and the system of international division of labor based on fragmentation of production.
This study focuses on the case of Poland and the potential benefits it can reap from becoming part of global production and distribution networks. Studying this question in the context of a transition economy is particularly interesting, since its sudden opening to foreign investment after a long period of isolation allows us to observe the process of integration into global networks more clearly. From an economist's perspective, this unique opportunity is the next best thing to a natural experiment.
The study reviews briefly the developments in Poland's foreign trade and FDI inflows that took place over the recent years. Poland's foreign trade in goods has recorded uninterrupted growth since 1989 especially strong on the side of imports. Its geographic orientation shifted from the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries towards the European Union. The composition of exports changed significantly with skilled labor intensive products growing in importance. Poland has also attracted relatively large inflows of FDI, especially in the second half of the 1990s. Over the last decade, the composition of FDI inflows has shifted from advertising-intensive joint ventures towards R&D-intensive wholly owned projects.
Foreign owned firms have already had a significant impact on Poland's international trade. Our findings indicate that foreign owned firms tend to be more export-oriented than local companies and that they tend to operate in industries that are more capital and skilled labor intensive. Foreign owned firms are often active in sectors with large export potential (i.e., so called 'sunrise sectors'). The data also suggests that thanks to the activities of MNCs Poland is becoming part of the rapidly growing global production and distribution networks. The study concludes that the large volume of FDI inflows will contribute to an expansion of Polish exports which will be driven by production fragmentation and participation in the global division of labor.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a brief overview of methodological issues involved in assessing the role of foreign-owned firms in international trade. Section 3 discusses changes in FDI inflows in terms of their value, ownership and other characteristics. Section 4 identifies changes in Poland's trade patterns during transition, whereas Section 5 links these changes to foreign owned firms. Section 6 focuses on production and distribution networks as revealed in Poland's trade with the EU and presents case studies of three foreign companies active in Poland. The concluding section closes the paper.
II. Methodological Issues: problems of measuring intra-product trade
The possibility of 'dividing up the value chain' of production allows for internatio nalization of the manufacturing process on unprecedented scale with deep implications for the global division of labor. The result of these developments is-to borrow an apt phrase from Feenstra (1998)-integration of trade and disintegration of production i n the global economy. MNCs are instrumental in setting up supply chains cutting across many national borders. Complex specialization implicit in intra-industry trade extends the division of labor to parts and components of products within larger transborder supply chains and leads to intraproduct trade (Arendt and Kierzkowski 2000) .
Production fragmentation occurs across national borders thus triggering extra foreign trade flows. A significant portion of these flows is intra-firm trade, i.e., transactions taking place among subsidiaries of MNCs. Fragmentation of production may also manifest itself through outsourcing, which does not involve acquiring property rights over a supplier by a contracting firm. Without access to firm data, which are usually not disclosed, precise assessment of this intra-product trade is very difficult.
There have been a few attempts to assess empirically the scope of foreign trade that can be directly attributed to production fragmentation. Some studies use intra-industry trade (IIT)-as measured by the well-known Grubel-Lloyd index 4 -to estimate the growth of trade due to fragmentation (Kierzkowski 2000) . While the IIT clearly includes fragmentation-related trade, it also captures a large portion of trade that may have little to do with production sharing or fragmentation. 5 Undoubtedly, fragmentation-driven intra-product trade accounts for some portion of ITT. The empirically observed positive correlation between multinational activity and IIT (Markusen and Venables 1998) would cle arly point in this direction. But it would be difficult to estimate the share of this trade in IIT. The distinction between horizontal and vertical intraindustry trade-the latter involves exchange of similar goods of different quality, whereas the former comprises exchange of similar goods that are not differentiated in terms of quality-does little to solve the problem. Products subject to mutual exchanges often enter different market niches, although in some cases lower quality products may be imported for processing.
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Other authors suggest employing the 'end-use' categories of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, which allow to identify products in terms of their use by buyers rather than by their positions in production process (Feenstra 1998; Irwin 1996) . This typology identifies the following five categories: foods, feeds and beverages; industrial supplies and materials; capital 4 The GL index of intra-industry trade between two partners is usually expressed as:
, where X represents exports of a country to its partner and M imports from the partner of product i. The index suffers from two problems: aggregation and aggregate trade imbalances.
5 Technological factors may lower the minimum efficient scale of production and thus allow the market support more firms and greater variety (Hufbauer, 1970) . Furthermore, consumer preferences rather than globalization of production shape trade in, for instance, motor vehicles between the EU and the United States. This trade allows realization of economies of scale thanks to greater product specialization in differentiated products.
goods (excluding autos); consumer goods (except autos); and automotive vehicles and parts.
7 While this typology makes it possible to assess changes in exports and imports in terms of increased or decreased processing, it does not give any more direct information on trade due to production fragmentation. The fall in the combined share of foods, feeds and beverages, industrial supplies and materials merely indicates that processed goods play a growing role in country's trade. But it remains unclear which portion of this trade can be directly attributable to the shift in stages of production (or value chains) across borders.
Yeats (1998) has brought to attention a more direct way of estimating this trade. He pointed out that data required estimating trade in parts have been available in foreign trade statistics based on SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) Revision 2 for the last two decades. The most complete coverage is within machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), which distinguishes among around 60 individual three-, four-, and five-digit product groups consisting solely of other manufactured equipment. But there is one major problem with this approach-it dramatically underestimates the share of intra-product trade. In fact, the SITC does not do a good job in distinguishing between assembled goods and parts. Although, for instance, a piston engine is not identifie d as 'a part' in the SITC system, it may be clearly a part of an automobile. Similarly, the SITC system identifies parts of TV tubes and electronic microcircuits.
But TV tubes, electronic microcircuits, etc. themselves may also be parts assembled in other products. The line is fuzzy but in some cases its identification is relatively straightforward. Kaminski and Ng (2001) suggest expanding analysis to parts identified in other sections of SITC as well as to components and final products in four sectors of manufacturing: office equipment; telecommunication equipment; motor vehicles and furniture. The latter has been included to account for very important role that furniture plays in trade of Central European transition economies. The first two sectors-office equipment and telecommunication equipment-represent production associated with information revolution. The empirical evidence suggests that MNCs dominate these two sectors as well as motor vehicles. Suppliers in these sectors tend to be either subsidiaries of MNCs or operate in outsourcing within MNC networks of manufacturing and distribution. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that furniture producers tend to be integrated into larger retailers. Kaminski and Ng refer to the production arrangements in these sectors as production and marketing networks.
In order to establish the link between networks and FDI, we shall use the data on exports of foreign owned firms by sector since some sectors can be easily related to respective networks.
Furthermore, we shall discuss two case studies that offer additional insights into developments within automotive and telecommunications networks and one case study going beyond the network analysis. The latter example provides evidence that participation in global networks of production and marketing often involves horizontal rather than vertical FDI, whereas the automotive case suggests that a firm may serve several MNCs rather than a single one.
III. Shifts in Foreign Direct
Investment: from "advertising-intensive" joint ventures to "R&D-intensive" wholly owned projects by Meyer (1998) shows that technology-intensity is not a determinant of a firm's probability to invest in the region. Furthermore, Smarzynska (1999) finds that foreign firms with low, rather than high, R&D-intensity were more likely to undertake FDI in transition economies in the early 1990s. At the same time firms undertaking FDI in the region were found to be highly advertisingintensive. Thus, while Poland was not attracting high technology investors in the early 1990s, it was definitely benefiting from an inflow of marketing skills.
Indeed, during the initial stages of transition, there were two notable factors attracting FDI to Poland. First, there was unsatisfied demand for consumer goods and services, a legacy of central planning which was strongly biased against services and consumer products. FDI carried out in a distortion-free policy environment yields several benefits to an economy in transition. 9 Foreign investment is a powerful vehicle for transfers of technology, best management practices and for integrating domestic production capacities into global networks of production and distribution. As recent research shows, firms with foreign equity participation are more like ly to export than firms with purely domestic capital. Similarly, the probability that a firm commences exporting is two and a half times higher for firms with foreign equity participation that for firms without foreign capital (Kraay et al. 2000) . Becoming part of a production and distribution network of an MNC offers a 'cheap way' of marketing products.
Firms do not incur marketing cost, which are usually quite significant for newcomers (Roberts and Tybout 1998) . The experience of Hungary shows the importance of FDI in industrial realignment and contribution to competitiveness in international markets. 10 Furthermore, FDI allows firms to realize economies of scale and leads to the growth of intra-industry trade. The advantage of this trade vis-à-vis inter-industry trade is that it is less vulnerable to swings in domestic business cycle and it does not produce such significant inequalities in regional development and income distribution.
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Despite its internationally praised stabilization-cum-transformation program launched in 1990 and opening to foreign investment, Poland did not attract significant FDI inflows until 1995 following its agreement with the London Club. In 1995, the value of FDI inflows into Poland surged to US$3.6 billion (net of repatriation), which amounted to around 80 percent of the aggregate value of FDI inflows over 1990-94 and was double of the value in 1994 (Table 1) .
Measured against the GDP, the volume of FDI was equal on average to around three percent over As a relatively short time has elapsed since FDI began flowing on a larger scale into Poland, its full impact is yet to be felt. As can be seen from data in Table 1 , about 43 percent of the value of total FDI inflows over 1990-99 came in 1998 and 1999. Poland accounted then for almost half of total flows to Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-10 14 ). Given the size of the FDI inflows one suspects that their impact on the Polish economy will be quite substantial.
Taking into account lead times involved in construction and restructuring, the full impact of FDI on the economy is yet to materialize, although it has already been significant. Consider first foreign firms' rapidly expanding role in industrial restructuring. The share of foreign firms in total investment outla ys increased from 20 percent in 1994 to 33 percent in 1996 and 40 percent in 1997. In manufacturing, this share is significantly higher and amounted to 56 percent of the total in 1997.
Considering already high levels of FDI penetration in industry and services, an interesting question is how FDI has affected Poland's foreign trade. The next three sections seek to provide an answer to this question by first delineating features of foreign trade in the 1990s and then assessing the extent to which FDI has been responsible for them.
IV. Salient Features of Poland's Trade during Transition
Four features of Poland's trade stand out. First, foreign trade turnover has expanded continuously since the implementation of stabilization cum transformation program in 1990.
Second, its composition has undergone enormous change indicating successful effort in industrial restructuring. Third, the factor content of Poland's exports to the EU has shifted towards skilled labor intensive and capital intensive products. Fourth, Polish exporters seem to have been breaking away from "sunset" markets, as they specialize increasingly in products for which EU import demand has been growing.
An important feature of development in Poland's foreign trade in the 1990s was a much faster expansion in imports than in exports. The former grew on average 27 percent annually and the latter expanded at 10 percent per annum. The value of exports doubled from US$15 billion in 1990 to US$30 billion in 1998, whereas the value of imports grew six times from US$8 billion to US$48 billion. During the past decade the European Union became the most important trading partner of Poland. The share of Polish exports directed to the EU increased from 47 percent in 1990 to 68 percent in 1998. The corresponding increase in imports was from 51 to 66 percent.
Since 1991 Poland has had a trade deficit. The ratio of export earnings to import expenditures has grown each year reaching 60 percent in 1998 down from 80 percent in 1994-95.
Continuous increase in the size of the trade deficit has been a major concern for policy makers.
The trade deficit was exacerbated by the Russian crisis that led to a 68 percent drop in Poland's exports to Russia during the first nine months of 1999 as well as by the slowdown in Polish exports to the EU. 15 The latter increased only by 2.2 percent in 1999 which was less than the 3 percent increase in EU external imports. While Poland maintained its relative position vis-à-vis other Central and Eastern European countries in terms of share in CEEC-10's EU-oriented exports, its performance was dwarfed by that of Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The second important feature of Poland's trade during transition was a very significant shift in its composition towards manufactured goods indicating a rapidly unfolding process of industrial restructuring (Kaminski 1998 and 1998 respectively, whereas the latter fell from 28 percent to 25 and increased to 31 percent over the same period. In assessing the scale of these changes, note that the value of imports more than doubled between 1993 and 1998. Source: Own calculations from EU foreign trade data as reported to the UN COMTRADE database. Note: (a) Export Specialization Index is calculated as a ratio of shares of Polish exports to the EU to the shares of the EU external imports.
The third notable feature concerns the shift in factor content of Poland's EU-oriented exports towards skilled labor intensive products (Table 2) . Although Poland's exports of unskilled labor intensive goods have been steadily increasing in both absolute and relative terms and constitute the most important group in Poland's exports, it can be argued that this shift towards skilled labor intensive products will continue thus closing the gap between Poland's endowment in human capital and the factor content of its exports. Consider that unit labor costs have continued to increase in Poland-by 2.9 percent in 1995, 12.6 percent in 1996, and 1.5 percent in 1997. 16 Consider also that only few Polish producers of unskilled labor intensive products (e.g., textiles) possess internationally recognized brand names. In consequence, one
should not expect a further expansion of exports in this product group. As an example may serve the fact that outward processing trade in textile and apparel industry has been moving away from
Poland towards its eastern neighbors where labor costs are lower.
The differential between wages of skilled workers in Poland and in western European countrie s, however, continues to remain high. 17 Thus, there exists a scope for increasing the exports of skilled labor and capital intensive products to the EU. Another look at Table 2 indicates that indeed the absolute value and the relative importance of these two types of products in Poland's exports increased significantly in the 1990s. The two categories accounted for 45 percent of Poland's exports to the EU.
The last part of Table 2 presents the specialization indices, defined as share of product category i in Poland exports relative to its share in EU external imports. The figures suggest that
Poland's strong specialization in unskilled labor intensive products and its decreasing specialization in natural resource based goods, have been augmented by specialization in skilled labor intensive products which emerged in 1997.
Another prominent feature of Polish exports is a steady movement away from traditional stagnant markets. This is important because it makes a difference whether a country specializes in products for which import demand is growing or in products for which the import demand is either stagnant or contracting. The former, often referred to as sunrise sectors, offer greater space for expansion, whereas in the latter (sunset sectors) competitive pressures are on the increase.
Similarly, prospects for expanding exports are better in sunrise than in sunset sectors.
To assess to which sectors Polish exporters tend to gravitate, we use the following criteria to define sunrise markets in the EU: (i) the value of EU external imports in terms of SITC fourdigit product categories is at least US$10 million, (ii) the average growth rate of imports is above 5% over 1996-98, and (iii) EU imports increased every year in this period.
16 See EBRD 1998 (Table 3.7) . 17 The average wage in Poland was equal to US$320 per month in 1998 (EBRD 1998, p.66 At the top of the list in terms of value and rate of growth are television receivers (SITC. 7241). One should also note the presence of electric power machinery (SITC. 7221) ranked third in terms of growth and value of exports. As discussed below, these are the sectors in which MNCs, such as Thomson and ABB, and international production networks associated with them play an important role.
In fact, foreign owned firms have been responsible for the identified above four features of Poland's trade patterns during transition. We shall now turn to a detailed discussion that provides empirical supports to this observation.
V. Foreign Firms and External Trade
Foreign owned firms have shaped the dynamics of Poland's trade on both export and import side. Aggregate statistics in Table 4 reflect the growing importance of firms with foreign participation in Poland's international trade. In 1994, such firms accounted for 21 percent of Poland's total exports. This figure increased to 38 percent in 1996 and 48 percent in 1998. Thus, these firms are now responsible for almost half of Polish exports. Between 1994 and 1998 the value of their exports increased more than three-times from US$3.6 billion to US$13.5 billion.
Considering that FDI significantly increased over 1997-99, the share of foreign owned firms in total exports is likely to expand. On the import side, this share was larger than that of exports in each year over 1994-98, although it recorded lower growth rates. Foreign owned firms account now for over half of Polish total imports. For this reason, many observers accuse foreign owned firms of having an adverse effect on the balance of trade because of their allegedly excessive imports. Indeed, exports by foreign firm were lower than their imports in 1994-98. And so were exports by domestically owned firms. But domestically owned firms paid for a larger share of their imports through their own export earnings. However, the ratio of export earnings to imports was consistently falling from 95 percent in 1994 to 67 percent in 1998. While the value of this ratio for foreign firms was lower and volatile, the difference between the two declined substantially over 1994-98. Nonetheless, the difference remains high and indeed foreign owned firms made a significantly larger contribution to the growing gap between exports and imports.
The relevance of this finding is not only limited but also misleading. Consider the following. First, as was observed earlier, pent-up consumer demand attracted many foreign investors during the initial stages of transition. These were mainly import substituting investments. The increased imports of inputs were probably offset by lower imports of final products. Hence, their impact on trade balance was probably positive. Furthermore, provided that tariff jumping was not the sole rational e behind these investments, their products are competitive not only in domestic but also in international markets. Consider that industrial imports originating in Poland's preferential partners (EU, EFTA and CEFTA) have largely unimpeded (i.e., dutyfree) access to the domestic market. Products produced domestically thus face fierce competition.
Combined with international marketing skills and resources, foreign owned firms could easily switch to foreign markets, if domestic circumstances warrant it. Thus, whatever their initial motivations in setting up production might be they may easily operate in other markets.
Second, sudden surge in FDI inflows usually results in spike of capital equipment imports. Foreign owned firms contributed to the increase of these imports over 1993-98. They purchased abroad US$3,944 million worth of capital goods in 1998, which constituted a 20 percent increase from US$3,274 million of capital goods imported in 1997 and a 263 percent increase from US$1,086 million in 1994. 18 Note that from the point of view of the balance-ofpayments situation, this deterioration in the current account position is offset by inflows into the capital account.
Third, with the entry of foreign firms in retail trade, imports formerly regarded as domestic have become attributable to foreign firms.
Last but not least, the propensity to import does not depend on ownership but on availability of locally produced inputs and consumer products. If these are domestically available at internationally competitive prices, a firm, no matter whether locally or foreign owned, will refrain from more expensive imports. It takes time to find local cost-effective suppliers and thus establish backward and forward linkages. The rule of thumb says that it usually takes around 2-3 years to develop local sourcing capacity. While a firm operating in a global network's supply chains is usually 'condemned' to export as long as the next point downstream is not shifted to Poland, domestic demand conditions shape export behavior of other foreign firms. Hence, the crux of the matter is that efficiently run firms will display similar behavior in terms of their decision to import since if a firm relies on more expensive domestic inputs, its capacity to compete in international and domestic markets will be hampered.
On the other hand, however, the ability of the firm to export is likely to increase with foreign ownership even without any changes in technology or organization of a firm. This happens especially when foreign ownership offers access to marketing and production channels 18 Own calculations based on figures from Foreign Trade Research Institute (various years, Table 3 .1).
of a parent company (see Section VI). Since establishing presence in foreign markets requires not only marketing skills but also considerable resources, foreign ownership increases prospects for exports. In addition, the change of ownership may be a necessary condition for a firm to become a supplier in a global production and marketing network.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that foreign owned firms tend to be more exportoriented than domestic ones and are therefore bound to make a relatively larger contribution to reintegration of Poland into the world economy. Without tracing export behavior of the same set of foreign and locally owned firms over time, it is impossible to make any generalizations. But even if a foreign owner acquires a domestic firm, which was highly export-oriented, this usually does not impede its capacity to export. To the contrary, it usually makes it even more competitive in both domestic and external markets.
The comparison of export orientation of Polish and foreign owned firms provides strong empirical support for this conclusion. The percentage of income of foreign owned firms derived from exports fell between 1995-97 (from 15.3% to 13.9% and 13.8%) and increased in 1998 (14.1%). The corresponding figure for all firms operating in Poland declined each year over 1995-98 from 10.4 percent to 9 percent. But the export intensity (measured in terms of the share of exports in total income) of foreign firms to export intensity of all firms was 1.47 in 1995, fell to 1.42 in 1996 and then grew rather significantly to 1.48 in 1997 and 1.57 in 1998.
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Another indication of export orientation of foreign owned companies is that they have already firmly established themselves among the largest firms and the largest exporters in Poland.
Among the 500 largest enterprises in Poland there were 144 firms with foreign capital (or 29 percent of the total) accounting for 46 percent of exports of the group in 1999. The average export revenue earned by a firm with foreign capital was equal to US$224 million, as compared to US$97 million for a locally owned company. On average, a firm with foreign capital increased its export earnings by 14 percent between 1998 and 1999, while for domestic firms the corresponding figure was only 2 percent. Moreover, firms with foreign capital were on average more export oriented shipping abroad 27.5 percent of their output as compared with 17 percent for locally owned firms.
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A similar picture of the growing presence of foreign firms among the largest exporters emerges from the examination of Poland's top 100 exporters. 21 The number of foreign owned firms among top 100 grew from 33 in 1997 to 43 in 1998. Again, the export orientation of foreign firms among top 100 as measured by the share of exports in their total sales (62% in 1998) was significantly larger than that of locally owned firms (49%).
Foreign owned firms have also contributed to the increased concentration of Polish exports as measured by the share of largest exporters in Poland's total exports. The share of Poland's top 100 exporters in total exports increased from 35 percent in 1996 to 39 percent in 1998. The share of foreign owned firms in the total exports of the group was 40 percent in 1998.
However, if exporters of such primary commodities as coal, sulfur and copper are excluded, this figure jumps up to 57 percent.
Foreign owned firms have largely influenced or even triggered positive change in factor intensities of Polish exports towards skilled labor intensive and capital intensive products. A review of Poland's 10 largest capital intensive and 10 largest skilled labor intensive products exported to the EU also provides links to the activities of foreign firms (see Appendix Table 1 ).
For instance, FIAT Poland seems to have contributed to the ten-fold increase in the value of exports of motor vehicles between 1990 and 1998, Phillips to the sales of electric lamps,
Thomson to exports of television sets, just to name a few.
Last but not least, foreign firms have made a large contribution to the integration of the Polish economy into international markets. Two features stand out-their ability to compete in multiple markets contributing to geographical diversity and their presence in expanding rather than contracting markets in the EU. Although foreign firms tend to concentrate mostly on EU markets, they have already displayed flexibility in terms of geographical orientation of their trade.
The share of EU markets in exports of foreign owned firms fell from 78 percent in 1995 to 75 percent in 1996 and 71 percent in 1997 and increased to 75 percent in 1998 (Appendix Table 2 ).
There are, however, clear signs that foreign owned firms contribute to the increase in Poland's export potential and competitiveness are likely to be enhanced by the recent increase in FDI in service sectors. While services do not increase exports of goods, they indirectly affect trade by lowering transaction costs and attracting foreign investors in manufacturing. Note that foreign companies accounted for 62 percent of total investment outlays in wholesale and retail trade in Poland and for 59 percent in the financial sector in 1997. 22 With the progressive opening of the banking sector, the importance of FDI in this sector has considerably increased.
The improvement in the quality of services together with the progress in structural reforms increasing contestability of domestic markets to producers and investors alike has also a profound impact on the expansion in intra-product trade based on fragmentation of production.
VI. Participation in EU-based production and distribution networks
Trade in industrial parts is the most rapidly growing component of global trade increasing faster over the last decade than trade in finished manufactures. According to a very conservative estimate, global trade in parts and components, amounting to around US$800 billion annually, accounts for around 30 percent of world trade in manufactures (Yeats 1998 ). This internationalization of production has been taking place within industries such as automobiles, television and radio receivers, sewing machines, office equipment, electrical machinery, power and machine tools, typewriters, cameras and watches (USITC 1996) .
The collapse of central planning removed systemic barriers to integration of CEECs firms into international markets. Until then, CEECs remained outside the reach of the globalization process based on production fragmentation or sharing. One would expect that with the transition to competitive markets locally and opening to the world, CEECs stand a good chance of taking advantage of a 'global disintegration' of production.
Incorporation of local producers into production and marketing networks can extend significant benefits both to the country involved, such as Poland, and to MNCs. For the latter, this 22 All data from Foreign Trade Research Institute (1999, p. 38) .
offers a wider menu of choices in their strategies to expand the position in global markets, as they may become more competitive thanks to lower costs of moving some production fragments to CEECs. For the former, it yields several advantages: it is usually accompanied by transfer of technology and managerial know how with potentially significant demonstration effects. It gives firms located in Poland direct access to larger markets that allow exploiting economies of scale. It boosts exports without firms incurring marketing costs and provides greater stability in earnings thanks to a global reach of a "parent" company. The expansion in network-driven trade contributes to boosting productivity and integrates the national economy into global markets.
Participation in marketing and production networks may entail two different forms of export behavior related to the position assigned to a firm in division of labor. The first form consists of the production by a foreign owned firm of finished products that the parent company distributes in regional or world markets. This is the case of the so-called horizontal FDI. The second form involves the participation of a foreign owned firm located in Poland in a supply chain of the parent company. In the theoretical literature, this is usually called vertical FDI.
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Without access to firms' usually confidential data, it is very difficult to assess the scope of trade associated with the first form, i.e., supplies of finished products to the parent company. As for the second form, one may suspect that foreign owned firms account for most, if not all, of trade associated with the networks discussed below.
Signs abound that Polish producers are becoming part of this rapidly emerging global division of labor based on production fragmentation. Like highly developed countries, Poland has also experienced a faster growth in trade of parts and components than in trade of manufactures.
Total exports of parts and components grew at an average rate of 33 percent per annum over 1995-98 and their share in total exports of manufactures increased from 7 to 10 percent over this period. Imports grew even faster at 37 percent per year and their share in total imports increased from 9 to 12 percent. EU has shaped the dynamics of this trade: its share in Poland's trade turnover rose from around 55 percent in 1993 to 75 percent in 1998.
To fully capture this trade, we identify parts, components and final products in three networks usually organized around MNCs-automotive network, telecommunication equipment jointly analyzed with office equipment and automatic data processing machines (hereafter 23 Strictly speaking, the theoretical literature uses the term horizontal MNCs to describe multi-plant firms that replicate roughly the same activities in many locations. Models of horizontal FDI have been developed by Markusen (1984) , Markusen (1987, 1992) and Venables (1997, 1998) . Vertical MNCs, on the other hand, are defined as firms that geographically fragment the production process into stages, typically on the basis of factor intensities. The literature on vertical MNCs includes Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) .
'information revolution' network) and furniture network. 24 Except for the furniture network as a rule dominated by unskilled labor intensive products, parts and components as well as final products of the other networks are technology and skilled labor intensive. These networks have played a growing role in Poland's trade with the EU. The share of these networks in Poland's exports of manufactures to the EU rose from 20 percent in 1993 to 27 percent in 1997 and 28 percent in 1998 (Table 5 ). The corresponding figures for imports were 19 percent in 1993, 22 and 20 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively . The value of aggregate exports of final products, components and parts of these networks increased almost three-fold over 1993-97 and by 21 percent in 1998, while the value of imports grew three-fold and 0.5 percent in the same period.
The furniture network is included in the study because large retailers in the EU shape both production and trade in this sector. In contrast to car manufacturing, which usually involves either foreign greenfield investment or equity investment, participation in furniture networks derives mainly from outsourcing, albeit not exclusively. This network has been traditionally the largest foreign currency earner in Poland. It brought US$1 billion in 1997 and US$1.2 billion in 24 For a list of product categories falling into each network, see Kaminski and Ng (2000) .
1998 with exports of parts and components accounting for a larger share of the surplus. Its share in total network exports of parts and components rose from 42 percent in 1997 to 46 percent in 1998.
The information revolution network embodies hardware of the current information revolution. The parts and components of the 'information technology' networks have driven foreign trade of highly developed countries with exports of office machinery displaying the fastest annual growth of 15.9 percent over 1978-95, followed by telecommunications growing at 11.5 percent over this period (Yeats 1998) .
In Poland telecommunications and recording equipment has almost exclusively driven the trade dynamics of this network especially on the export side. The shares of the other "sub- (Table 5) .
As for the automotive sector, globalization based on production fragmentation has been the major driving force behind transformation of auto industry worldwide in the 1990s. It has also deeply affected the ways in which this sector has changed in Poland, albeit the foreign trade policy vis-à-vis this sector seems to have distorted its evolution. In contrast to other Central European countries participating in this network (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia), the value of exports of final products in the automotive network has been below the value of imports of parts and components. Poland relied mostly on assembling motor vehicles as well as piston engines from imported parts for domestic consumption rather than for shipments within the network. This was due to high tariffs and other subsidies provided to investors in this sector during the initial stages of transition.
By 1998, however, some negative impacts of initially high tariffs and subsidies began to retreat. Exports of parts and components grew 29 percent and their share in networks exports increased from 42 percent in 1997 to 46 percent in 1998. Aggregate exports rose 18 percent whereas imports contracted by 10 percent. Thus it appears that distortions induced by a high effective rate of protection of final products have been alleviated by the increase of domestic production of parts and components.
To assess the scope of MNCs present in Poland in network exports we look at the data on the weight of sectors in exports generated by foreign firms ( Table 6 ). Note that two sectorselectrical machinery and appliances and transport equipment-accounting together in 1998 for 40 percent of exports by foreign firms largely fall within networks. As can be seen from data in Table 6 , the share of foreign owned firms in exports of electrical equipment and t ransport equipment amounted in 1998 to 65 percent and 70 percent respectively.
Exports of transport equipment as a rule take place within automotive networks organized around large MNCs. While some firms involved in information revolution network are in the sector of electrical equipment, machinery and appliances (e.g., television sets and tubes), it would be difficult to separate them. Total exports of electrical machinery alone rose 31 percent in 1998 and the value of export specialization index exceeded unity. It seems that this impressive improvement can be attributed to the incorporation of local producers in a global system of production and marketing. According to a very conservative estimate, their share in EU-oriented exports of manufactures increased from around 20 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 1998. The share of foreign firms of 43 percent is also high (and growing) in miscellaneous manufactured articles, which includes among others furniture.
However, like in the case of electrical machinery and transport equipment, it is impossible to directly attribute export activity to foreign owned firms. Some insights can be gained from the discussion of specific examples of how the presence of MNCs contributes to Poland's participation in global productio n and distribution networks. The first example presents a case study of Delphi Automotive Systems, which is relevant to the automotive network.
Another example focuses on investment projects undertaken by Thomson and relates directly to the information revolution network. The last example relates to the case of ABB. 
Delphi Automotive Systems
In 1988 General Motors (GM) began the process of creating within its structures a separate entity focused exclusively on producing automotive parts and components. As a result of this process, Delphi Automotive Systems was established in December 1998. Initially, 100 percent of its shares were owned by GM but subsequently all the shares were distributed among In 1999, they employed 4,423 people and their revenues amounted to $383 million.
The ABB group follows the pattern of international division of labor. Namely, each company within the group produces final goods that are sold all over the world through the ABB distribution networks. And thus for instance, a Polish member of the group, ABB Elpar is the worldwide supplier of high voltage switchgear.
About twenty percent of products manufactured by ABB in Poland are exported, mainly to the EU but also to places located as far as New Zealand and Australia. ABB imports about twenty percent of its inputs. The growing area of activity include exports of services and R&D.
Recently, ABB has opened an R&D center in Krakow.
ABB Elta is the first company in Poland to possess a certificate of integrated quality and environmental management system complying with ISO 9001 and 14001, for the whole scope of activities. ABB has required ISO 9000 certificates from its local suppliers and in the future it may also require environmental management certifications.
VII. Conclusions
Technological developments in recent decades have led to an increasing importance of international division of labor and creation of global production and distribution networks. MNCs have been a major force driving these developments. Integration into the production and marketing arrangements of the multinational corporations may offer many benefits to transition economies, which after a long period of isolation liberalized their trade and investment regimes. This paper studies the growing importance of global production networks and the role of MNCs in integrating a host country into the international division of labor in the context of Poland. It provides evidence of Poland's increasing participation in global production and distribution networks that is taking place through FDI inflows. It concludes that thanks to a large volume of FDI inflows expected in the near future, Poland's exports dr iven by production fragmentation will continue to expand at even faster rates than those observed in recent years.
